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& Financial Management at the International Hellenic University. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the nonlinear relation between the level 
of founding family ownership of companies in Greece with the dividend pay-out 
decisions they follow. Furthermore, it is going to be examined how a financial distress 
situation influences the association between family ownership and dividend payouts. 
At a theoretical level, a reference is going to be made regarding the two arguments 
that can be put forward to explain the dividend policies of family-controlled firms: the 
alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. The aim of the study is to investigate 
the effect of family ownership on dividend policy and prove that the relation between 
family ownership and dividend policy is not monotonic but effectively varies by 
ownership levels. Furthermore, a reference is going to be made to the agency theory 
view of dividend policy, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and to the 
institutional framework regarding the dividend requirement legal setting in Greece. 
In order to fulfill the requirements of my dissertation I have asked the guidance and 
help of one of my professors, in the master program that I attend, Dr. Alexandros 
Sikalidis, which I would like to thank for all the necessary guidelines, tips and 
knowledge that he had provided me in order to carry out the preparation and writing 
of my thesis. 
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Introduction 
Family businesses, rather than multinational corporate giants, are for most countries 
the backbone of the economy, having a decisive contribution to growth and 
employment. According to market research, family businesses account for the two-
thirds of all businesses worldwide, contribute at least 70% of world GDP and provide 
50% - 80% of the jobs in many countries (UBS’s Report for family businesses in Greece, 
2019). The European Family Businesses Organization states that family businesses 
account for 60% to 90% of all companies in various European countries, as well as 40% 
- 50% of private employment in the region. 
In Greece, according to the data from the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
more than 80% of the Greek companies are family-owned and contribute a total of 
two thirds of the country's GDP and working positions, while continuing to support 
the Greek economy, showing at the same time remarkable resilience to the crisis. 
The decision on the dividend policy of a company is one of the most important 
business decisions and for this reason a lot of research has been made the last decades 
regarding this issue and it has been the topic of many scientific papers in the financial 
literature. Dividends are essentially the reward for the shareholders for their decision 
to invest in a company and for the risk they are willing to undertake. This decision, 
however, is influenced by various factors, such as the level of the company's profits, 
its investment opportunities, the size of the company, the pressure from the 
shareholders, etc. (Ali Shah et al., 2011). However, according to the international 
literature and various empirical studies, dividend policy is influenced by another 
important parameter: the ownership structure of companies. 
Α lot of studies have pointed out the fact that there is not a linear relation between 
the ownership structure and the level of dividends that the companies distribute in 
the markets and this is the main purpose of this paper. To examine the nonlinear 
relation between the level of founding family ownership of companies in Greece, 
enlisted to the Athens Stock Exchange, with the dividend pay-out decisions they 
follow. Furthermore, it is going to be examined how a percentage of institutional 
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investors in the ownership of the aforementioned companies could also affect the 
dividend policies they follow.  
At a theoretical level, a reference is going to be made regarding the two arguments 
that can be put forward to explain the dividend policies of family-controlled firms: the 
alignment effect and the entrenchment effect. The aim of the study is to investigate 
the effect of family ownership on dividend policy and prove that the relation between 
family ownership and dividend policy is not monotonic but effectively varies by 
ownership levels. Furthermore, a reference is going to be made to the agency theory 
view of dividend policy, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and to the 
institutional framework regarding the dividend requirement legal setting in Greece.  
This paper finds evidence that the entrenchment hypothesis does exist also in the 
Greek market and relates to the ageing theory. There is a level that equals to 38% up 
to which the family ownership percentage is negatively related to the distribution of 
dividends but until that level the aforementioned distribution is positively related, 
depicting by this way that the relation between these two factors is not linear but a u-
shaped. 
The structure of this paper is organized as follows: In the first chapter there is a 
presentation of the Greek accounting legislation framework and more specifically to 
the new law that was introduced and relates to the operation of public limited 
companies. In the second chapter a reference is made to other scientific papers that 
relate to the subject of corporate dividend policy and examine such cases in different 
markets by implementing different mathematical and theoretical approaches. The 
third chapter refers to the development of the hypothesis that are presented in this 
paper. The fourth chapter refers to our empirical analysis in which there is a reference 
to the data and to the shareholder’s categorization. Next, the main empirical model 
of this paper is presented accompanied by an analysis of the variables that have been 
used. Then, is a statistical analysis of the data that have been collected and the next 
chapter presents the regressions analysis that relate to our hypothesis. The last 
chapter of the paper is the conclusion which is followed by the references and the 
appendix. 
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Greek Accounting Legislation Framework 
In Greece, the law that was established and was the foundation on which the creation 
of Société Anonymé (SA) has been based was the Law 2190/1920 which was amended 
by the new Law 4548/2018. According to Martin T.C. and Novaes W. (2010) there are 
only five civil-law countries, including Greece, where mandatory dividend legislation 
applies. This legislation sets the framework for the payment of dividends to the 
shareholders of profitable Greek corporations, along with the Law 148/1967 some 
articles of which are supplementary to the Law 2190/1920 regarding the dividend 
payments. 
Law 2190/1920 
According to this law, the net profit of the Société Anonymé arises if the expenses 
related to the year as well as the unusual expenses are deducted from the income. 
The distribution of profits takes place, provided that the loss of previous years is first 
offseted. From the remaining profits, the income tax is deducted and then also a 
percentage of 5% is deducted (unless the statute stipulates otherwise) in order to form 
a regular reserve.  
According to article 44 of the Law no. 2190/1920, at least 1/20 of the net profits must 
be withheld by the company to form a regular reserve. This obligation ceases but exists 
when the amount of the regular reserve reaches 1/3 of the paid-up share capital. After 
removing the above, the company distributes the first dividend to shareholders. The 
first dividend is the amount between 6% of the paid-up share capital and 35% of the 
net profits that arose after the deduction of the regular reserve. The remaining net 
profits are disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the company's statute and 
the decisions of the General Assembly. 
Law 4548/2018 
Almost 100 years after the publication of the law 2190/1920, the issue of 
harmonization of Greek legislation with European standards regarding the operation 
of public limited companies was raised, as a result the Greek legislator proceeded with 
a complete reformulation of the existing legislation for public limited companies. On 
June 13 2018, Law 4548/2018 is published in the Government Gazette in order to 
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reform of the law of public limited companies. The new framework, which completely 
revises the law 2190/1920, is to be implemented from 1/1/2019.  
The set of provisions concerning the distribution of profits of SA are reflected in 
articles 158 to 162 of the law 4548/2018. For their distribution the net profits, if and 
to the extent that they can be disposed of, in accordance with article 159, are actually 
disposed of by a decision of the General Assembly in the following order: 
1) The amounts of the credit items of the income statement, which do not constitute 
realized profits, are deducted. 
2) The deduction according to the present Law and the statute are deducted for the 
formation of a regular reserve. 
3) The amount required for the payment of the minimum dividend, as defined in 
article 161, shall be withheld. 
4) The balance of the net profits, as well as any other profits that may arise and be 
disposed of in accordance with Article 159, shall be disposed of in accordance with the 
provisions of the statute and the decisions of the General Assembly. The amount to 
be distributed is paid to the shareholders within two (2) months from the decision of 
the ordinary General Assembly that approved the annual financial statements and 
decided the distribution. 
Amendments between Law 2190/2019 & Law 4548/2018 
With the announcement of the new law, Sociétés Anonymés are obliged to include in 
their statute within the year 2019, all the relevant amendments arising from this 
reform with the decisions made by their General Assembly and taken under a simple 
majority or quorum. Some of the amendments are presented below. 
Amendment no. 1 
According to the new Law 4548/2018 (article 160, par. 2), everything that refers to the 
previous law regarding the order of distribution of profits is valid, but now they are 
preceded by the deduction of credit funds from the income statement that are not 
realized profits. 
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Amendment no. 2 
According to the previous law 2190/1920, (article 44a, par. 2), the amount distributed 
to the shareholders may not exceed the amount of the results of the last year that has 
expired plus the profits from previous years and the reserves for which their 
distribution is allowed and decided by the General Assembly, when the amount of 
losses of previous years is reduced as well as the amounts that must be allocated for 
the formation of reserves in accordance with the law 2190/1920 and the statute. On 
the contrary, according to the new law 4548/2018, (article 159, par. 1) the amount of 
the results of the last year is reduced by the amount of the credit lines of the income 
statement that do not constitute realized profits. 
Amendment no. 3 
In accordance with the pre-existing law 2190/1920, and particularly with the article 
45, par. 1, income tax was not taken into account for the determination of the net 
profits. Quite the reverse is happening in the article 160, par. 1 of the new law 
4548/2018. The net profits of the company are those that are reflected in the income 
statement and arise in the application of the new law. Income tax is taken into account 
for the determination of the net profits. 
Amendment no. 4 
According to pre-existing law 2190/1920, the Société Anonymé is obliged to distribute 
as a minimum dividend (article 3 of L.D. 148/1967) a percentage of at least 35% on the 
net profits of the year after deducting: 
 Booking for the regular reserve, 
 profits from the sale of shares which have been held for at least ten years and 
represent a share of more than 20% of the paid-up share capital of the subsidiary 
of the company; and 
 the net profit remaining from the valuation of financial instruments at their fair 
value after deducting losses from the same cause. 
On the other hand, in accordance with the law 4548/2018 (article 161, par. 1 & 2), the 
Société Anonymé is obliged to distribute as a minimum dividend a percentage of at 
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least 35% on the net profits of the year after deducting the booking for the regular 
reserve and the income statement credit lines that do not come from realized profits. 
Literature review 
The subject of corporate dividend policy has captivated economists for a long time, 
resulting in intensive theoretical modeling and empirical examinations (Frankfurter & 
Wood Jr., 2002). There has been a lot of research regarding the different dividend 
policies and strategies that follow companies from all around the world and a lot of 
theoretical models try to explain the puzzling reality of corporate dividend behavior. 
According to Frankfurter and Wood most of the times these theoretical models lack 
strong empirical support and are conflicting, however they provide us with a good 
background in order to better understand the reasons behind the different pay out 
policies that the companies globally implement and how they are affected by factors 
relate to their governance, corporate structure and ownership. 
Some scientific papers that examine the relation between ownership structure and 
dividend policies of the firms are the following:  
Helen Short, Hao Zhang and Kevin Keasey, (2001), in their scientific paper entitled “The 
link between dividend policy and institutional ownership” have examined the link 
between dividend policy and institutional ownership for the UK firms. Moreover, they 
examine the potential association between ownership structures and dividend policy 
using the models of Lintner, Waud, Fama and Babiak. Their results indicate that there 
is a positive association between dividend payout policy and institutional ownership 
but a negative association between dividend payout policy and managerial ownership. 
The reason why privatized firms pay higher dividends, is the topic of the paper of 
Abhinav Goyala, Shrikant P. Jategaonkarb and Cal B. Muckleyc, (2020), that have 
examined the effects of state income and reputation incentives to the high dividends 
of privatized firms. In their paper the authors demonstrate how the extent of state 
ownership is positively related to corporate dividends and that the reason behind the 
high dividends of privatized firms works as an incentive in order to enhance the state's 
reputation to minority shareholders.  
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In their paper, “The relation between dividends and insider ownership in different 
legal systems: international evidence”, Jorge Farinhaa and Óscar López-de-Forondab, 
(2009), present new international evidence on the aforementioned relationship by 
analysing a sample of USA, UK and Irish firms characterized by an Anglo-Saxon 
tradition and a matching sample of other EU companies from Civil Law legal systems. 
They conclude to the fact that while in firms with an Anglo-Saxon tradition the relation 
between dividends and insider ownership follows the pattern negative–positive–
negative, in Civil Law countries the relation is positive–negative–positive. 
Øyvind Bøhren, Morten G. Josefsen and Pål E. Steen, (2012), in their paper entitled 
“Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy” compare the dividend policy of owner-
controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-
owner employees, customers, and community citizens. Their findings suggest that 
despite the ownership status of the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend 
payout decision to moderate rather than to sharpen the conflict of interest with the 
weak stakeholder. According to the authors, these findings are consistent with a 
dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is 
discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. 
Jorge Farinha in his paper, “Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the 
Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis”, (2003), presents an 
empirical analysis of the agency theory explanation for the cross-sectional distribution 
of dividend payouts in the United Kingdom (UK), while Dechun Wang in his paper 
“Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality”, (2005), investigates the relation 
between founding family ownership and earnings quality using data from the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 companies. Through his research he finds evidence that 
founding family ownership is connected with lower abnormal accruals, greater 
earnings information, and less persistence of transitory loss components of the 
earnings. Moreover, the results suggest a nonlinear relation between family 
ownership and earnings quality. 
The correlation between institutional ownership and volatility is the subject of the 
paper of Amir Rubin and Daniel R. Smith (2008), which have found that this correlation 
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depends on the firm’s dividend policy. They have concluded that institutional 
ownership is negatively related to volatility among non-dividend paying stocks and 
vice versa. In addition, Balasingham Balachandran, Arifur Khan, Paul Mather and 
Michael Theobald (2017), in their paper “Insider ownership and dividend policy in an 
imputation tax environment” have found out that firms are more likely to pay 
dividends with higher payout ratios in an imputation tax environment. Their results 
indicate that the decision to pay dividends is positively related to the insider 
ownership and this effect does not vary between traditional and imputation tax 
systems.  
Julian Atanassova and Aaron J. Mandellb (2018) in their paper entitled “Corporate 
governance and dividend policy: Evidence of tunneling from master limited 
partnerships” have used a sample of 85 Delaware master limited partnerships in order 
to examine the relation between cash dividend policy and the strength of corporate 
governance, measured by contractual governance provisions. Their results indicate 
that firms with weaker governance pay out more cash dividends than better governed 
firms. 
A lot of research regarding the impact of corporate ownership on dividend policy have 
been carried out also in Asian countries without large discrepancies in the results that 
have already been presented in this paper.  
More specifically, Meryem Duygun, Yilmaz Guney and Abdul Moin, (2018), in their 
paper “Dividend policy of Indonesian listed firms: The role of families and the state” 
have found evidence that family-controlled firms prefer to pay less dividends whereas 
the corporations with higher state ownership resort to larger dividend payments. At 
the same result they have concluded also Evy Mulyania, Harminder Singhb and 
Sagarika Mishrab, (2016), at their paper entitled “Dividends, leverage, and family 
ownership in the emerging Indonesian market” in which they examine the roles of 
dividends and leverage to mitigate agency problems within family firms in Indonesia. 
This phenomenon is also presented in countries like Taiwan in which family-controlled 
firms pay less cash dividends than the ones that are not family-controlled. 
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In comparison with what we have already seen there are some cases in which there is 
a little relationship between family ownership and dividend policy, as it is depicted in 
the research of Zhilan Chen, Yan-Leung Cheung, Aris Stouraitis and Anita W.S. Wong 
in their paper, entitled “Ownership concentration, firm performance, and dividend 
policy in Hong Kong”, (2005) in which they have analyzed a sample of 412 publicly 
listed Hong Kong firms, during 1995–1998. The same case is presented also in the 
paper of Basil Al-Najjar and Erhan Kilincarslan, in which they resulted to the fact that 
foreign and state ownership are associated with a less likelihood of paying dividends, 
while other ownership variables like for example the family involvement, domestic 
financial institutions and minority shareholders do not influence the probability of 
paying dividends (“The effect of ownership structure on dividend policy: Evidence from 
Turkey”, 2016). 
Regarding the subject of this paper there has also been evidence from Latin America 
which indicate that family-CEO firms pay less amount of dividends and invest more in 
capital expenditures than nonfamily-CEO firms do (Briano-Turrent et al., 2020). It has 
been shown that when ownership concentration is high and the largest investor is 
identified as an individual, firms tend to pay fewer dividends consistent with individual 
investors extracting benefits from minority shareholders (Gonzales et al., 2017).  
Last but not least, regarding the policy of dividend smoothing, Klaus Gugler (2001) in 
his paper: “Corporate governance, dividend payout policy, and the interrelation 
between dividends, R&D, and capital investment” finds that state-controlled firms 
engage in dividend smoothing, while family-controlled firms do not. This theory is also 
supported by the paper of Javakhadze et al. (2014), whose findings indicate, among 
others, that firms with highly-concentrated ownership structure and strong corporate 
governance smooth dividends less (“An international analysis of dividend smoothin”).  
Development of Hypothesis 
The purpose of this paper is to explain the relation between the dividend policy that 
the Greek firms follow in accordance with their government structure and more 
specifically their ownership status. For this reason, there have been gathered firm 
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level data related to Greek firms that are listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. The 
Athens Stock Exchange market has been selected on purpose, since the family-owned 
firms play a significant role in it as they exceed the 44% of the listed firms 
(Koumentakis, 2020). 
In order to analyze the relation that has been presented in the previous paragraph a 
reference should be made to the entrenchment hypothesis that derives from the 
agency literature and describes the situation where the managers and the 
shareholders of a firm could not take action against opportunistic and non-value 
maximization behavior by some large stockholders who aim to personal benefits that 
may affect negatively the value of the firm. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Farinha, 2003). 
According to Farihna1 this entrenchment hypothesis affects a lot the dividend policy 
in a different way than the one described in other competing theories regarding the 
behavior around dividends.  In his paper he describes that there is an entrenchment 
level below of which insider ownership and dividend policies can be viewed as 
substitute corporate governance devices and as a result the relation between these 
two variables is negative. Above this level he has observed that it occurs the exact 
opposite phenomenon in which this relation is positive. The reason behind this 
observation lies to the fact that when the insider ownership increases, additional 
agency costs arise which may lead the dividend policy to become a “compensating 
monitoring cost”. This phenomenon ends up depicting according to Farihna a U-
shaped relation between insider ownership and dividend policy, something that has 
not been observed in other theories respectively. In this paper an implementation of 
this theory is going to be presented and for this reason the first hypothesis to be set 
is the following: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Above the entrenchment level the insider ownership and dividend 
payouts are positively related while below this level they are negatively associated. 
 
1 Farinha J. (2003). Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment 
Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 30(9) & (10), 0306-686X. 
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Another parameter that arises from the dividend theory is related to the fact that 
when a family-owned company faces a financial distress situation or wants to expand 
in the market and make investments, increases its borrowing capacity and at the same 
time, decides to follow a very strict dividend policy that will allow it to be more flexible 
financial by having increasing cashflows and handle its debt obligations with ease. This 
assumption is in line with the expropriation argument that has been presented in the 
paper of Claessens et all (2000) in which the authors demonstrated the fact that family 
firms prefer to follow a lower dividend payout policy in order to maintain cash that 
they can expropriate in a financial distress situation for example. The above 
assumption will be the base of the second hypothesis of this paper, which is the 
following: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The distribution of dividends has a negative relation with the 
leverage (debt) of the firm. 
Empirical Analysis 
In order for this paper to examine the two hypothesis that have been set in the 
previous section and to present a clear image of the dividend strategies that have been 
applied by the entities listed in the Athens Stock Exchange Market, an empirical 
analysis has been implemented with the use of statistical and econometric models, 
that have successfully been used in other scientific papers, who examined the same 
phenomenon under different perspectives and geographical locations. 
Data 
The sample that has been used in this analysis consists of 205 companies listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) market and the data that have been gathered cover the 
period from 2005 to 2016 (12 years). The data have been gathered from the 
Thompson/Eikon Database along with the ASE database and from research to the 
companies’ websites for information regarding the consistency of the stakeholders of 
each company and other useful financial information. 
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Since there has been a severe financial crisis in Greece that has affected a lot the 
economy and subsequently the companies operated in the country, the results of the 
current analysis could be altered and diversified a lot at the preselected period and 
for this reason it has been decided by the author to run the analysis using data 
covering the period from 2008 to 2016, in which the Greek economy was in a 
downturn. 
Shareholders’ categorization 
In order for this analysis to be carried out there should be a reference to the different 
categories of the shareholders that have a stake at the companies’ share capital and 
influence with their votes the decisions that are taken by the General Assembly and 
affect the management of each company. The types of the shareholders can vary and 
be for example family investors, private investors, individuals, the government, 
research firms, venture capitals, banks, trusts, insurance companies, investment 
advisors, endowment funds, institutions and many more. 
Thomas Kirchmaier and Jeremy Grant in their paper entitled “Corporate Ownership 
Structure and Performance in Europe” (2004) for the purpose of their research have 
categorized the investors in three main categories of legal control, de-facto control 
and widely held ownership. In this paper we are interested to observe two categories 
specifically of shareholders, the family investors and the institutional investors. The 
latter consists of mutual or pension funds, insurance companies, investment firms, 
private funds, endowments or other large entities that manage funds on behalf of 
others. For the purpose of this analysis the sample of the entities selected will be 
categorized accordingly to four main categories: family investors, institutional 
investors, government own and other, which include all the other types of 
shareholders and the cases where there is not a unique stakeholder which holds more 
than the twenty percent of the shares. 
In order to define whether a shareholder has the control of an entity through voting 
power it has been decided to use the twenty percent rule that has been used widely 
in the empirical research, like for example in the paper of Porta et al. (1999), entitled 
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“Corporate Ownership Around the World”. In this paper the authors have used data 
of 27 wealthy economies in order to examine which shareholders are large enough to 
have working control on the firms under investigation. According to the authors the 
idea behind using 20 percent of the votes is that this is usually enough to have 
effective control of a firm and they present evidence in their paper to support this 
notion.   
In the following table it is depicted the analysis of the companies enlisted in the Greek 
Stock Exchange Market (ASE) that consist the sample of this paper, in respect to their 
status of ownership as it was described before. 
 
Table 1: Data obtained from the ASE Database for the period 2008 – 2016. 
For the purpose of this paper there have been collected data from 154 companies 
enlisted in the Athens Stock Exchange Market for the period 2008 to 2016. The 
categorization of the companies according to their ownership status is fully depicted 
in Table 1. It can be easily deducted from the total number of companies for each year 
the fact that some companies have been gone public after the year of 2008 while some 
other companies have been delisted before the year of 2016 and as a result the total 
number of companies fluctuates significantly (in some years at least) and is not the 
same for each year of the period under scrutiny. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of Ownership for each category for the period 2008 - 2016 
Year Family Investors Institutional Investors Government Own Other Total
2008 4 18 2 88 112
2009 34 34 3 15 86
2010 29 32 2 11 74
2011 22 18 3 15 58
2012 41 28 2 14 85
2013 43 31 0 12 86
2014 37 28 0 7 72
2015 37 31 2 8 78
2016 39 33 0 10 82
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According to the table above (Table 2) the majority of the companies enlisted in the 
Athens Stock Exchange market, for the period under scrutiny (2008 – 2016) is family 
owned on average, at a ratio of 41%, while the institutional owned companies are the 
35% of the sample, the government owned 2% and the companies with a different 
type of ownership 22%.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that there have been some cases where the ownership 
status of some companies was not unique and as a result the same company was 
presented both in more than one category of ownership. Each of these cases were 
examined separately according to the author’s experience in the financial field and in 
cases where the company was categorized in more than one category the family status 
was prevailed and they categorized as such. In any case, these were some few 
incidents and they will not be investigated further as we deviate from the purpose of 
this paper. 
Empirical Model 
 In order to be able to observe how the dividend policy of the Greek entities enlisted 
in the stock market is affected by their ownership status, we have collected data from 
154 companies for the period under scrutiny, 2008 to 2016, which correspond to 733 
firm year observations. The purpose of our examination is to locate the entrenchment 
level that it is necessary in order to explain the entrenchment hypothesis that have 
been presented in detail in the previous chapters. 
This paper will try to prove that also in the Greek market the aforementioned 
hypothesis does exist and that above the entrenchment level that we are going to 
point out, the relation between dividends and ownership structure will be positive 
while in the opposite scenario this relation is going to be negative. As it has already 
been presented in the previous chapter, Farihna in his paper, “Dividend Policy, 
Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical 
Analysis.”, explains very well this kind of relation and for this reason we have chosen 
to use the same model, which is a second-degree polynomial model to run our 
multivariate regression, in the program of Stata 13.0. 
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The model that has been chosen to run our equation is depicted in the following 
equation: 
DIVASSi,t = k0 + a1FAMILY_OWNi,t + a2SQ_FAMILY_OWNi,t + a3INST_OWNi,t + 
a4GOV_OWNi,t + a5ROAi,t + a6SIZEi,t + a7DEBTi,t + a8LN_AGEi,t + a9GROWTHi,t + 
a10NANALISTSi,t + a11OCFi,t + ∑INDUSTRY + ∑YEAR 
Considering that i stands for each firm of our sample and t for the year in which we 
refer to, and the fact that the model above is a second-degree polynomial, the graphic 
display will be a U-shaped curve depicting the non-linear relationship between the 
variables. A detailed analysis of the use and the significance of each value will be 
presented in the next chapter.  
In order to find the entrenchment level, the point in which the two variables, 
ownership and dividend polices change their relation from negative to positive, we 




If we consider all the other variables as constants and propose that the fraction of the 
derivatives of the dividends to assets to the percentage of family ownership level 
equals to zero then we will find the entrenchment level that we need in order to curry 
out our analysis and result to our conclusions. 
Analysis of the variables 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to identify how the ownership status 
influences the dividend policy of a firm. For this reason, some variables that we believe 
that affect the dividend policy of a firm, have been taken into consideration in order 
to run our model. We will proceed with the detailed explanation of these variables 
and the main reason we believe that these variables have an impact on the company 
and the environment in which it operates. The variables that have been used in our 
analysis could be separated in three main categories: the payout variables, where the 
dependent variable of our model belongs (dividends to assets), the ownership 
variables which depict the different ownership structures (Family, Government and 
Institutional Ownership), the controlled variables which are the variables that relate 
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to the size of each company and to the probability of each company’s dividend 
distribution policy and finally the dummy variables, that refer to the industry and year 
effect in the model. 
Pay Out Variable 
To start with, according to the Greek law 4548/2018 (article 161, par. 1 & 2) it is 
established that all the entities with the legal form of Société Anonymé (S.A.) are 
obliged to pay to their shareholders every year the following amount: net profits of 
the year (more or equal to 35%) minus the reserve retained by law, as dividends. The 
amount not paid to shareholders or reserved to the entity, is retained by the company 
to pay off debt or to reinvest it in core operations. In this way in our model, we chose 
to use as the dependent one, the variable Dividends to Assets (DIVASS). DIVASS 
indicates the amount of dividends scaled over the total assets. As Abreu & 
Gulamhussen (2013) stated in their paper, by choosing this variable as dependent, the 
results of their investigation were not driven by the stock price and this variable it is 
widely used in the literature as a way to monitor the dividends payouts. 
Ownership Variables 
By using the variable FAMILY_OWN, which stands for family ownership and indicates 
the percentile of the shares owned by the founding family in a company, we would 
like to prove the correlation and the dependence between the dividends distributed 
to the shareholders who are also the founders of a family company.  
Moreover, we chose to use the square form of the variable above, SQ_FAMILY_OWN, 
in order to convert our model to a second-degree polynomial, and, in this way, to 
assume that the relationship between dividend distribution and ownership of a family 
company is not linear.  
To continue with, apart from the shareholders which are family members and 
founders, we have also taken into consideration the cases in which the ownership 
status defers and relates to other different types of ownership. The main categories 
in which we have separated our population are the companies in which an institution 
holds more than the twenty per cent of their stake, by using the variable INST_OWN, 
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and companies that are their ownership belongs to the government and the 
government bodies, by using the variable GOV_OWN. Regarding the institutional 
ownership, it is referred to the shares of a company owned by investment firms, 
insurance agencies, entities which handle the funds of other entities etc. As for the 
government ownership, it refers to the shares of a company which are state-owned. 
Since these three main categories are present to the Athens Stock Exchange Market, 
we have chosen to analyze these as a comparison to the family-owned firms which 
constitutes a significant percentage of the firms enlisted in the Greek stock market. 
Control Variables 
For the purpose of our analysis, we wanted to monitor how the distribution of 
dividends is related to factors like the ratio of the Return on Assets (ROA) of a 
company. This ratio shows the profitability of a company by making a comparison to 
the company’s net earnings with their total assets. It is considered to be an important 






Apart from ROA we have chosen to use also another variable that depicts the 
profitability of the company, the OCF, which stands for Operating Cashflows on Assets. 
This is a ratio multiplied by 100%. Operating cashflows are the actual money that a 
company creates from its natural activities. The net cashflows form operating 
activities are divided by the average of the total assets in order to give the operating 
cashflows on assets ratio. 
Operating Cashflows on Assets = 
      
  
 × 100% 
Since both the two aforementioned variables express the company’s profitability and 
in order to mitigate the multicollinearity effect that may arise from the use of two 
variables who demonstrate a similar information, we have decided to run our model 
with both the two variables, one at a time, and observing at the same time the 
adjusted R, in order to produce the most reliable results for our conclusions. 
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To continue, since our main concern is to provide the most reliable results possible, 
we have chosen to use logarithms to some of our variables in the model, in order to 
make the distribution of our dependent and independent variables in our regression 
to seam more symmetric. The above notion is widely known in the empirical scientific 
papers and it is especially used by the researchers in cases when they have outliers. 
Generally, this tactic reduces the heteroscedasticity and by taking this in consideration 
we chose to select some variables which are depicted as logarithms. First of all, in our 
model we used the variable SIZE which is the logarithm of book value of assets and it 
is used as a proxy for the firm size. As the size of the firm increases, so does the 
opportunity for the profitability of the company and the possibility to distribute 
dividends is more likely to happen.  
SIZE = Log of Total Assets 
Another, variable which contains logarithms in our model is LN_AGE, which refers to 
the logarithm of the firm’s age + 1. The age of a firm is the number of the years that 
the company is active and we can find this number by calculating the difference 
between the current year and the year of the establishment of the company. As 
Mohammad et all. (2014) refer to their paper, there is a positive and significant 
relationship between company age and dividend ratio but a negative one between 
dividends distributed and financial leverage, a variable that we have also used and we 
are going to describe it next. 
In order to present the financial leverage in our model we used the variable DEBT. 
Debt is a proxy for leverage. This is the book value of total debt scaled by total assets, 
which practically shows the debt that a company has in order to finance its assets by 
investing that amount of money in expanding its operations and be more profitable. 
The variable NANALYSTS is the log of the number of analysts (ANALYSTS + 1) following 
a particular firm. The decision of adding this particular variable was based on the fact 
that the number of financial analysts, following a firm, is crucial and plays an important 
role in investigating the management behavior and generally the firm’s governance 
decisions on dividends. This phenomenon is described in the empirical study of Chen, 
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TYPE OF VARIABLE VARIABLES INDICATORS DESCRIPTION OF MEASURMENTS
PAY OUT VARIABLE DIVIDEND TO ASSETS DIVASS Dividends scaled over total assets
FAMILY OWNERSHIP FAMILY_OWN Percentage owned by family investors
SQUARE OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP SQ_FAMILY_OWN Square of family ownership
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP INST_OWN Percentage owned by institutions
GOVERNMENTAL OWNERSHIP GOV_OWN Percentage owned by government and government bodies
RETURN ON ASSETS ROA Indicates the earning before interest and taxes on assets
SIZE OF THE FIRM SIZE The logarithm of book value of assets, proxy for firm size
LEVERAGE DEBT Is the book value of total debt scaled by total assets, proxy for leverage
LOGARITHM OF AGE LN_AGE Natural logarithm of the firm's age (firm age + 1)
PAST GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES GROWTH The percentage of sales increase, proxy for past growth opportunities
LOGARITHM OF ANALYSTS NANALYSTS The log of the number of analysts following a particular firm (ANALYSTS +1)
OPERATING CASHFLOWS ON ASSETS OCF Indicates the operating cashflows on assets
INDUSTRY DUMMY VARIABLE INDUSTRY Dummy variable for the industry type
YEAR DUMMY VARIABLE YEAR Dummy variable for the year
OWNERSHIP VARIABLES
CONTROL VARIABLES
Harford and Lin (2015), in which the authors explore the causal effects of analyst 
coverage on mitigating the managerial expropriation of outside shareholders. 
The last control variable that we use in our model is the GROWTH variable. This 
variable depicts the percentage of sales increase and is a proxy for past growth 
opportunities. The importance of this variable lies to the fact that bigger firms, firms 
with higher investment opportunities are likely to pay more dividends and generally 
as it is depicted in the literature, the more a company grows in size, the more probably 
is to distribute dividends to its shareholders. 
Lastly, we have calculated and put to our model some dummy variables that refer to 
the year and the industry, since they enable us to use a single regression equation to 
represent multiple groups. This is a widely used tactic for the researchers, in order to 
run their regressions in the most effective way. 










In this chapter we are having a statistical representation of the data that have been 
gathered and used in our model in order to have a comparative image of each variable 
and especially between the different ownership structures, as they have been defined 
in the previous chapters. 
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CATEGORIES VARIABLES MEAN MEDIAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM
STANDARD 
DEVIATION
P25 P75  OBSERVATIONS 
% of Family Investors 0,2501             0,0662 0,0000 0,9232               0,2988             0,0000 0,5252 733                      
% of Government Bodies 0,0163             0,0000 0,0000 0,7500               0,0928             0,0000 0,0000 733                      
% of Institutions 0,2405             0,0802 0,0000 0,9879               0,3020             0,0011        0,3760 733                      
Return on Assets 0,4078             0,3422          0,0152      0,9990               0,2520             0,1824        0,6097          733                      
Firm Age 36                    34                 1               106                    19                    23               44                 733                      
Total Assets (Firm Size) 1.144.509.082 165.223.250 5.378.900 33.637.501.000 3.413.064.419 65.051.000 581.776.000 733                      
Firm Age (Ln) 3,4825             3,5553          0,6931      4,6728               0,5343             3,1781        3,8067          733                      
Total Assets (Firm Size, Ln) 19,1762           18,9228        15,4980    24,2389             1,6978             17,9907      20,1816        733                      
Leverage 0,3660             0,3475          -            5,0950               0,3247             0,1928        0,4799          733                      
Growth 0,0357             0,0054          (3,4437)     9,9518               0,6437             (0,1115)       0,1221          733                      
Operating Cashflows on Assets 0,0417             0,0310          (0,2659)     0,6124               0,0823             (0,0020)       0,0772          733                      
Log Number of Analysts 0,6547             -                -            3,2958               1,0022             -              1,0986          733                      







Dividend/Assets 0,0170             




Return on Assets 0,4166          0,3475        0,0915      0,9990             0,2521             0,1954        0,6117          284                       
Firm Age 35                 32               9               101                  17                    23               40                 284                       
Total Assets (Firm Size) 368.610.723 87.050.660 5.378.900 7.403.408.000 1.011.421.816 33.316.243 192.786.750 284                       
Firm Age (Ln) 3,4971          3,4811        2,3026      4,6250             0,4126             3,1781        3,7136          284                       
Total Assets (Firm Size, Ln) 18,4017        18,2820      15,4980    22,7252           1,4387             17,3216      19,0771        284                       
Leverage 0,4083          0,3676        -            1,5302             0,2519             0,2404        0,5153          284                       
Growth (0,0345)         (0,0126)       (1,0000)     2,6667             0,3388             (0,1533)       0,0751          284                       
Operating Cashflows on Assets 0,0313          0,0245        (0,1517)     0,3630             0,0662             (0,0077)       0,0668          284                       





Dividend/Assets 0,0113          0,0062        -            0,0693             0,0162             -              0,0144          284                       
In the table below (table 4) we present some basic statistical information that relate 
to the variables of our model in general. 
 








From the table above, it can be deducted that the average ratio of dividends to assets, 
for the period under scrutiny, is 1,7%, while the average age of the firms is 36 years. 
The average growth rate of the companies is 3,57%, their average return on assets is 
41% and their average leverage ratio is 36,6%. Finally, the average total assets of the 
companies, which is an indicator of their size, is 1.144.509.082 euro. 
It would be interesting to compare the above statistics in regard of the three different 
main ownership categories, the family-owned companies, the state owned and finally 
the institutional owned companies. The results of this comparison are depicted in 
detail in the tables below.  
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Return on Assets 0,4012             0,3466          0,0152        0,9965               0,2505             0,1694          0,5936             253                       
Firm Age 39                    39                 1                 106                    21                    23                 50                    253                       
Total Assets (Firm Size) 2.473.225.240 528.120.000 15.792.360 33.637.501.000 5.388.450.897 138.278.840 1.307.980.770 253                       
Firm Age (Ln) 3,5248             3,6889          0,6931        4,6728               0,6513             3,1781          3,9318             253                       
Total Assets (Firm Size, Ln) 20,0781           20,0848        16,5750      24,2389             1,7734             18,7448        20,9918           253                       
Leverage 0,3533             0,3244          -              5,0950               0,4345             0,1337          0,4727             253                       
Grow th 0,0404             0,0046          (3,4437)       9,9518               0,7781             (0,1070)         0,1306             253                       
Operating Cashflow s on Assets 0,0506             0,0430          (0,2659)       0,3650               0,0848             0,0030          0,1017             253                       





Dividend/Assets 0,0174             -                -              0,2191               0,0316             -                0,0237             253                       




Return on Assets 0,3960          0,3933          0,1371          0,9937             0,2378             0,1905          0,4627             15                         
Firm Age 13                 11                 8                   33                    6                      10                 13                    15                         
Total Assets (Firm Size) 913.810.662 390.032.650 131.515.710 5.058.864.000 1.247.921.045 223.048.200 1.145.722.000 15                         
Firm Age (Ln) 2,5783          2,4849          2,1972          3,5264             0,3137             2,3979          2,6020             15                         
Total Assets (Firm Size, Ln) 20,0389        19,7817        18,6946        22,3444           1,0953             19,1597        20,8591           15                         
Leverage 0,1076          0,1088          -                0,2427             0,1003             0,0007          0,2106             15                         
Grow th (0,0792)         (0,0397)         (0,7250)         0,1072             0,2188             (0,0954)         0,0716             15                         
Operating Cashflows on Assets 0,1751          0,0753          (0,0735)         0,6124             0,1941             0,0287          0,3124             15                         





Dividend/Assets 0,1162          0,0153          -                0,4964             0,1669             0,0061          0,1824             15                         



















From the tables above it is clear that the family-owned companies pay on average the 
least of dividends while the state-owned companies pay the most dividends on 
average. There are also significant differences in the other variables as well, like for 
example in the average firm size, where the institutional owned firms are the biggest 
in comparison to the other two types of companies. The average return of assets is 
higher in the family-owned companies but the difference with the other two types of 
companies is insignificant. Regarding the firm age, the state-owned companies are the 
youngest ones, with an average of twelve years of operations. Another important 
difference that is worth mentioning is the average leverage of the firms. From the 
above tables it is clear that the family-owned companies rely the most on debt (by an 
average of 40%, in comparison to a 35% of institutional and 10% of state-owned 
companies) in order to finance their assets and invest that amount of money in 
expanding their operations and be more profitable. 
The Role of the Family Ownership on Dividend Policy – Evidence from Greece 
 
 
  22 
 
It would be interesting to compare the above results regarding the average amount of 
leverage that is bigger to the family-owned companies with the results of the scientific 
paper of Ramalho, Rita and da Silva (2018), which investigates the influence of family 
ownership on firm leverage across different subgroups of family and non-family firms 
and how the capital structure of their firms has been influenced by the financial crisis 
of 2008. The results of their paper coincide with the ones presented in this paper since 
both the findings of the two papers demonstrate that the 2008 crisis had a substantial 
positive impact on the family firm leverage by rendering the family firms more prone 
to use debt after 2008. 
Regression Analysis 
In this chapter we are going to present the results of our empirical analysis that answer 
our two hypothesis that relate to the dividend policies that the companies of our 
sample follow. 
Dividends relation to ownership status 
In order to be able to find the relation between our dependent variable (i.e., dividends 
to assets) and the independent ones and answer our first hypothesis, we need to find 
the entrenchment level, as we have already seen in the previous chapters of this 
paper. In order to do so, we have run a multilinear regression four times, by applying 
different variables each time, to conclude to the most significant results that will 
describe best our model.  
The results from the four regressions that have been calculated through the program 
of Stata are shown in the table below. Each time, the number of observations was 
constant (733) and we have used also the type of industry and the different years of 





The Role of the Family Ownership on Dividend Policy – Evidence from Greece 
 
 
  23 
 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 1st Regr. 2nd Regr. 3rd Regr. 4rth Regr.
FAMILY OWNERSHIP -0,0081 -0,0922*** -0,0865*** -0,0878***
STD. ERROR 0,0071 0,0189 0,0178 0,0178
SQUARE OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP - 0,1206*** 0,1132*** 0,1147***
STD. ERROR - 0,0259 0,0244 0,0244
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP - -0,0060 -0,0058 -0,0062
STD. ERROR - 0,0061 0,0057 0,0057
GOVERNMENTAL OWNERSHIP - 0,1561*** 0,1436*** 0,1443***
STD. ERROR - 0,0204 0,0193 0,0192
RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) 0,0074* 0,0090** - 0,0065
STD. ERROR 0,0045 0,0042 - 0,0040
FIRM SIZE (LOG) -0,0033* -0,0047*** -0,0052*** -0,0051***
STD. ERROR 0,0018 0,0017 0,0016 0,0016
DEBT -0,0112*** -0,0093** -0,0047 -0,0047
STD. ERROR 0,0043 0,0040 0,0038 0,0038
FIRM AGE (LOG) -0,1277*** -0,0124*** -0,0102*** -0,0103***
STD. ERROR 0,0040 0,0038 0,0036 0,0036
GROWTH -0,0016 -0,0016 -0,0008 -0,0009
STD. ERROR 0,0017 0,0016 0,0015 0,0015
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS (LOG) 0,0138*** 0,0148 0,0120*** 0,0121***
STD. ERROR 0,0028 0,0026 0,0025 0,0025
OPERATING CASHFLOWS ON ASSETS (OCF) - - 0,1416*** 0,1398***
STD. ERROR - - 0,0156 0,0156
INDUSTRY DUMMY VARIABLE Yes Yes Yes Yes
INDUSTRY YEAR VARIABLE Yes Yes Yes Yes
CONSTANT 0,1003** 0,1653*** 0,1233*** 0,1667***
STD. ERROR 0,0438 0,0459 0,0392 0,0432
ADJUSTED R SQUARE 0,4412  0,5049 0,5601 0,5613





















































The statistical significance of the coefficient of each variable is depicted with the use 
of the stars and it is explained as follows: for 1% significance correspond the three (3) 
stars, for the 5% significance correspond the two (2) stars and finally for the ten (10) 
% level of significance corresponds one (1) star. Under each variable is depicted its 
standard error which illustrates how on average the model is falsified since it is a 
measurement of the average distance that the observed values lie from 
the regression line.  
An interesting point that is deducted from the four-regression analysis of Table 4 is 
the increase of the adjusted R square each time we added more control variables to 
our model, in order to make it more accurate. The fact that the adjusted R2 is 
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increasing it shows that every new variable that have been added to our regression 
has improved our model more that it would have been expected by chance and as a 
result the addition of each new control variable has led to the increase of the model’s 
accuracy. 
So, in order to be able to find the entrenchment level which answers our first 
hypothesis we are going to use the results of the fourth regression analysis and we are 
going to put them in the below formula in order to find at which level the founding 
family ownership status has a positive relation to the dividend distribution policy of 
the company. 
As it has already been presented in the previous chapters the mathematical formula 




And by using only the statistically significant variables of the fourth regression (4rth) 
our model will be formed in the following way: 
Dividends to assets = -0,0878 family ownership + 0,1147 (family ownership)2 + 0,1443 
governmental ownership – 0,0051 firm size – 0,0103 firm age + 0,0121 number of 
analysts + 0,1398 operating cashflow on assets 
By derivatized and putting equal to zero the above equation as it is depicted in the 




= − 0,0878 + 2 ∗ 0,1147 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 = 0 
 
The result of the equation above that explains our entrenchment hypothesis and finds 
the entrenchment level that we need in order to derive to our conclusions is 38%. 
Above this level of ownership, the dividends distributed by the company have an 
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increasing trend and for family ownership levels below that percentage, that trend is 
diminishing. 
We should take into consideration the fact that these results depict a period in Greece 
where the financial crisis has hit in a very hard way the market and it would be 
interesting to compare the above result with a period in which the Greek market will 
be in an upturn. 
Dividends relation to financial distress 
The second hypothesis that have been established in this paper is that the more the 
family-owned firms have to increase their borrowing capacity the more are eager to 
decrease the amounts of dividends distribute to their shareholders in order to be 
more financial flexible and have more cash reserves at their disposal. In other words, 
we are going to see how a financial distress situation that leads to an increase of debt 
affects the association between family ownership and dividend payouts. 
In order to do so, we will use one of the models that have been presented in the paper 
of Mulyani et all (2016) in which the authors have examine the roles of dividends and 
leverage to mitigate agency problems within family firms in Indonesia by the use of 
simultaneous equations.  
The model that we are going to use contain the same variables, as they have been 
described previous in this paper and it is the following: 
DIVASSi,t = k0 + a1DEBTi,t + a2FAMILY_OWNi,t + a3ROAi,t + a4SIZEi,t + a5LN_AGEi,t + 
a6GROWTHi,t + a7NANALISTSi,t + a8OCFi,t + ∑INDUSTRY + ∑YEAR 
where the i stands for each firm of our sample and t for the year in which we refer to.   
The results from the regression that has been calculated through the program of Stata 
are shown in the table below. As in the previous regressions that they were run for 
the first hypothesis, the number of observations is still constant (733) and we have 
used also the type of industry and the different years of our sample as dummy 
variables. From our analysis we have excluded the sensitivity analysis that relates to 
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EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 1st Regr. 2nd Regr.
FAMILY OWNERSHIP -0,0081* -0,0075*
STD. ERROR 0,0071 0,0066
DEBT -0,0112*** -0,0062*
STD. ERROR 0,0043 0,0040
RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) 0,0074* 0,0048*
STD. ERROR 0,0045 0,0042
FIRM SIZE (LOG) -0,0033* -0,0037**
STD. ERROR 0,0018 0,0017
FIRM AGE (LOG) -0,0128*** -0,0105***
STD. ERROR 0,0040 0,0038
GROWTH -0,0016 -0,0009
STD. ERROR 0,0017 0,0016
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS (LOG) 0,0138*** 0,0110***
STD. ERROR 0,0028 0,0026
OPERATING CASHFLOWS ON ASSETS (OCF) - 0,1498***
STD. ERROR - 0,0165
INDUSTRY DUMMY VARIABLE YES YES
INDUSTRY YEAR VARIABLE YES YES
CONSTANT 0,1003** 0,1415***
STD. ERROR 0,0438 0,0455
ADJUSTED R SQUARE 0,4412 0,506





































the standard errors for each firm. This kind of sensitivity analysis could be 
implemented in the future from other researches based on the same subject. 













As it can be observed from the table above (Table 9) we have run two times our 
regression analysis in order to observe how the inclusion of the variable of Operating 
Cashflows on Assets (OCF) will affect the results of our model. Since the adjusted R2 
has been increased it is a sign that the additional variable (OCF) that has been added 
to our regression has improved our model more that it would have been expected by 
the factor of chance.  
As it was described before in the first regression of our first hypothesis, the statistical 
significance of the coefficient of each variable is depicted with the use of the stars and 
it is explained as follows: for 1% significance correspond the three (3) stars, for the 5% 
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significance correspond the two (2) stars and finally for the 10% level of significance 
corresponds one (1) star. Under each variable is depicted its standard error which 
illustrates how on average the model is falsified since it is a measurement of the 
average distance that the observed values lie from the regression line.  
The results of our regression (2nd regression) demonstrate the fact that the 
distribution of dividends have a negative relation to the ownership level of family 
members in the firm, a case that we have discussed thoroughly in our first hypothesis 
(entrenchment hypothesis) and a negative relation with the leverage (debt) of the firm. 
This is an indication that in the Greek market, for the period under scrutiny, the 
dividend distribution policy has been affected by the decision of borrowing by the 
family-owned firms and as a result our second hypothesis can be supported. It would 
be interesting to compare the above results with a research that will include data from 
the period in which the Greek market is in an upturn and see if the above association 
will be affected. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper it has been studied how the dividend distribution policies of the 
companies enlisted in the Athens Stock Exchange Market are affected by their 
different ownership status, in a period in which the Greek economy was in a 
downturn, since it has been affected by a world-wide economic crisis. We have 
gathered data for 154 companies for the period 2008 – 2016 and we have analyzed 
them in order to point out firstly the relation between family ownership and the 
amount of dividend distribution and secondly the relation between dividends payouts, 
leverage and the family ownership status.  
In order to answer our first hypothesis that relates to the ownership status and the 
distribution policy of the firms, we have used the entrenchment hypothesis theory 
and we have demonstrated the way that this theory actual works for the Greek 
market.  In order to do so we have found the entrenchment level, a point in which the 
dividends payouts start to have a positive relation to the ownership status while until 
that point their relation is negative (a u-shaped model). We have found that this 
specific entrenchment level that was based to our data and relates to the Greek stock 
market is 38%. 
Regarding our second hypothesis that we wanted to observe and was related to 
whether the dividends payments are affected negatively by the leverage of the firms, 
especially for the family-controlled companies, our findings have supported that 
hypothesis since the dividends’ payments were affected negatively by the leverage 
amount of the family-controlled firms, as it was depicted in our regression analysis.  
Our results can be interpreted also by the agency theory according to which the 
dividend payment is the outcome of effective pressure by minority shareholders to 
limit agency behavior (Manos R., 2003). In the case of Greece, the conflict between 
large and minority stakeholders lies to the fact that in most of the cases for the family-
owned companies the management and the Board of Directors is run by family 
members who are not eager to distribute dividends in order for them to have other 
The Role of the Family Ownership on Dividend Policy – Evidence from Greece 
 
 
  29 
 
type of compensation benefits to the detriment of the interests of the minority 
shareholders. 
It would be interesting for a future research to compare the results of this analysis 
with a period in which the Greek economy will be in an upturn and see how the 
aforementioned relations of the dividend policies and ownership will be changed. 
Another idea for a future research would be to compare the above results of this paper 
with the ones from other European countries and for the same period, since the Greek 
market is quite small in order for someone to have a clear image of how the dividends 
payouts are affected by different ownership status and other related variables. 
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